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The Global Seed Market, Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: 
Untying the Gordian Knot 
 
Ioannis Lianos, Dmitry Katalevsky and Alexey Ivanov 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper explores the competition dynamics of the global seed market. It 
documents the growth strategies of the major seed companies, in particular their 
M&A activity and their reliance on complex intellectual property strategies in order to 
offer a one stop shop solution to farmers. Recent merger activity in this sector (the 
Monsanto bid to buy Syngenta, the DuPont and Dow merger deal, ChemChina’s bid 
to buy Syngenta) illustrates its rapid transformation from an already concentrated 
industry to a tight oligopoly on a global scale.  The increasing global consolidation of 
this industry raises new challenges for competition law enforcement authorities 
dealing with the emergence of new powerful actors at the factor of production (input) 
level, in view of the broader concerns animating public policy in the food sector and 
the existence of a nexus of international commitments for biodiversity, sustainability, 
the right to food etc. By exploring this under-studied but fascinating area of 
competition law enforcement we open the debate over the inclusion of broader public 
interest concerns in competition policy and the consideration of its distributive impact 
from a global perspective.  
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The Global Seed Market, Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: 
Untying the Gordian Knot 
 
Ioannis Lianos, Dmitry Katalevsky and Alexey Ivanov1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The food supply chain is generally depicted as composed by three main levels: 
agricultural production, industrial processing and wholesale or retail distribution. At a 
closer look, however, the food supply chain becomes more complex, involving a 
number of other stages and links that add value to the chain either in the form of 
goods or services inputs. The food industry is heavily dependent on scarce 
resources like arable land, water and genetic resources (a limited biodiversity). At 
each level of the supply chain, firms as well as other organizational forms perform 
specific activities supplying goods or services. Moreover, at the same level there 
may be one or more firms performing the same or complementary activities, adding 
specific value at their stage of activity. The food supply chain, as a whole, originates 
before the agricultural sector, with the factor market (for example the seed provider) 
and ends with the final consumer.  
The power relations in the global food value chain are characterized by 
international actors and local producers operating within the geographic area 
determined by the logistics of the product. Issues of distribution of the total surplus 
value of the global food chain are thus paramount and should inevitably influence 
competition law enforcement. 
This paper will focus on the upper segment of the market — that of the factors of 
production and in particular seed players, and their relations with the other segments 
of the value chain, i.e. farmers. Global seed producers (Monsanto, Syngenta, 
                                                          
1
 Ioannis Lianos is professor of global competition law and public policy at the Faculty of Laws, UCL, 
Director of the Centre for Law, Economics and Society at UCL, Chief Researcher of the Skolkovo 
Institute for Law and Development, HSE (Moscow) and Principal Investigator of the Multi-jurisdictional 
project “Competition law and policy and the global food value chain”. Dmitry Katalevsky is Associate 
professor of the Institute of Business Studies within the Russian Presidential Academy of National 
Economy and Public Administration. Alexey Ivanov is Director of the Department for Legal Policy and 
Social Development at the Skolkovo Foundation and Director of the Skolkovo Institute for Law and 
Development, HSE (Moscow). Many thanks to Matthew Jay Strader and Spencer Weber Waller for 
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DuPont, Pioneer, BASF, etc.) continue to increase their global presence in the “seed 
chain” and have recently acquired critical market influence in key food exporting 
regions2. Combined with the natural complexity of global food production-supply 
chains, any disruption in seeds supply may cause a systemic food shock of a global 
magnitude. There have also been some significant changes at the upstream level of 
the food value supply chain which reinforce the power these global seed players 
exercise over a significant part of the global food value chain.  
First, these players develop intellectual property rights (IPRs) strategies, 
providing them a reward for the significant value they add to the chain through R&D, 
but also in order to reinforce their dominance towards farmers, capturing the 
significant part of the value added along the whole food pipeline. Agriculture has 
become increasingly technology driven (biotech, crop protection, microbial solutions, 
big data and analytics software). In the current value chain context, to remain 
competitive and to stay in business, farmers have to adapt the latest technologies 
from the global factors providers, who use intellectual property protection or Big Data 
as a bargaining tool in their relations with farmers. This makes farmers critically 
dependent on global agriculture technology providers and may lead to the 
development of bottlenecks. Farmers’ labor is increasingly commoditized causing 
social tensions, in particular in emergent economies and the developing world. 
Competition law is seen in some quarters as a possible response to this increasing 
power of global seed platforms.  
Second, the development of new technologies has led to the emergence of a 
diverse group of players: crop protection and seed companies, equipment 
companies, fertilizer companies, retail distributors, and pure-play digital start-ups. 
These seek to develop an “integrated offering of equipment and services for 
farmers,” enabling them to “gradually build a compelling one-stop solution that will 
                                                          
2
 The “seed chain” consists of three basic components: “research and plant breeding; seed 
multiplication; and marketing and distribution”: Niels P. Louwaars et al., Impacts of Strengthened 
Intellectual Property Rights Regimes on the Plant Breeding Industry in Developing Countries, (World 
Bank Report, February 2005), available at 
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/LouwaarsCGN_Plants_05.pdf, pp. 28-29 (noting the 
differences between developed and developing countries in the way the different components of the 
industry are structured. Seed multiplication, marketing, and distribution are essentially considered a 
commercial operation in developed countries, with research and plant breeding essentially carried out 
by commercial enterprises, in particular for high value seed crops, like maize, cotton, soybean, 
vegetables. In developing countries research and plant breeding is essentially carried out by the 
broader public or “parastatal” sector, or farmers’ themselves (farmers’ seed systems), while the other 
operations are considered more as vehicles for technology transfer rather than a commercial 
operation).  
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allow them to compete for the lion’s share of the market”3. Consequently, these 
companies develop strategies in order to develop new capabilities and exploit 
different sources of revenue by “applying new technology or by expanding across the 
value chain or geographically”4. This is achieved by significant merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity, leading to higher levels of concentration on several 
markets. Market players therefore have made the choice of positioning themselves 
as fully integrated providers, or the orchestrators of a network, or partners of an 
established network5, which may lead to the development of bottlenecks in the food 
supply chain affecting consumers and other market actors, such as farmers.  
The competition authorities in the U.S. and Europe were, so far, mostly 
supportive to this trend of economic concentration, which took different forms, such 
as corporate mergers, joint research enterprises and patent pools created by the 
leading global seed companies. This policy approach is primarily based on the 
theory that such concentration will increase innovation (probably espousing the 
Schumpeterian argument about innovation in this sector6), while not much attention 
is paid to the consequences such concentration may entail for the operation of the 
global food value chain as a whole, the power relations between the seed companies 
and other economic actors down the chain, as well as the incentive and ability of 
these other economic actors to innovate. The global value chain approach helps us 
understand the competitive interactions in the area from a different angle7.  
We will first explore these dynamics, by examining the role of IP rights in the 
development of the industry and the way the significant M&A activity played out in 
the structure of the industry. We will then delve into the competitive strategy of seed 
platforms and the likely development of the industry in the near future. Finally, we will 
examine how this new configuration may be of relevance to competition law 
                                                          
3
 Boston Consulting Group, Crop Farming 2030 – The Reinvention of the Sector (April 2015), 
available at https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/process-industries-innovation-crop-
farming-2030-reinvention-sector/, p. 10. 
4
 Ibid., p. 12. 
5
 Ibid., p. 15. 
6
 For the classic question of the appropriate market structure for innovation, see Philippe Aghion et 
al., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship, (2005) 120(2) The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 701-728. 
7
 On the Global Value Chain approach, see, inter alia, Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey and Timothy 
Sturgeon, The Governance of Global Value Chains, (2005) 12 Review of International Political 
Economy 78; Kevin Sobel-Read, Global Value Chains: A Framework for Analysis, (2014) 5 
Transnational Legal Theory 364-373. 
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enforcement and more generally the response of competition authorities, which has 
been quite timid so far in this economic sector. 
 
II. The expansion of intellectual property rights in the food value 
chain 
 
Historically, plant and seed material were regarded as communal resources to be 
freely shared. Farmers were incentivized to save, replant, and resell seeds to other 
farmers, the dominant paradigm for trait development being farmer sharing8. Starting 
with the mechanization and the use of tractors in the late 19th century and most 
recently with the granting of the first plant biotechnology patent in 1992, IP rights 
have long been used in the agricultural sector in order to stimulate research, 
development, and innovation. They also formed the basis for the emergence of a 
private seed industry following the Green revolution of the 1960s-1970s. Initially 
funded by the public sector, the Green revolution led to an important increase of 
productivity at a higher cost for the independence of farmers that have until then 
ensured the effort of innovation in the sector by developing crop diversity (a 
decentralised and highly fragmented innovation environment)9. Farmers became 
dependent on external seeds, which led to the emergence of a private seed market. 
The new varieties introduced by the Green revolution required also sharp increases 
in the use of fertilizers and pesticides, which added to the dependence of farmers on 
the private market and increased the need for credit. The development of biotech 
and genetic engineering in the 1990s had also profound implications for the 
development of the industry and the process of its privatization10. Hybrid crops 
provide high yields but also lose this advantage the following generation, thus 
leading farmers to buy new seeds regularly. 
                                                          
8
 Margaret Llewelyn, The Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions: An Alternative Approach, 
(1997) 19 European Intellectual Property Review 115, 117. The UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity, which entered into force on 29 December 1993, is still recognizing the importance of 
communal “knowledge, innovations and practices,” and encourages its signatories to “promote their 
wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge, innovations 
and practices,” and further encourages the “equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the 
utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices” (Article 8(j)).  
9
 See, Stephen .D. Biggs & Edward J. Clay, Sources of innovations in agricultural technology, (1981) 
9 World Development 321-336 (distinguishing between formal and informal agricultural research and 
development, farmers having played and still playing a significant role in informal R&D). 
10
 Daryl Lim, Living with Monsanto, (2015) Michigan State Law Review 559, 566-567. 
 
 
6 
 
Genetically modified (GM) (and shortly genetically edited following the 
development of the CRISPR/Cas technology) seeds are at the centre of the 
innovative effort in modern agriculture, the plant science industry being one of the 
world’s most R&D intensive industries, with no more than 10 big corporations 
controlling almost 50% of all seeds planted on earth right now (some estimates 
putting this figure to 73%, in 2010 up from 37% in 1995)11. The plant biotechnology 
R&D industry now consists of six large firms, a varying number of smaller firms, and 
public-sector research organizations. The degree of consolidation of this industry is 
remarkable if one takes into account that in the early 1980s there were more than 
two hundred different seed companies and that many agricultural chemical 
companies had both seeds and agricultural chemicals12. 
A lot of these companies control IPRs. In the seed business, IPRs consist of 
patents, plant variety rights, trademarks, trade secrets, and geographical 
indications13. These IP rights enable seed companies to prevent farmers from saving 
seeds of the protected variety, sharing it with their neighbours or selling it informally 
(“brown bagging”), but also to prevent competing plant breeders from using a 
protected variety in the development of a new variety (cumulative innovation), and to 
prevent competing seed producers from multiplying and marketing the protected 
variety without a license or using a protected product name and logos14. Seed laws 
requiring compulsory seed certification with the aim to police seed quality also 
provide some form of protection to breeders, in the absence of IPRs. 
Until recently, patents on living organisms were not recognized. In Diamond 
vs Chakrabarty, the US Supreme Court extended patent claims to life sciences, this 
leading to the emergence of the biotechnology industry15. In 1985, the USPTO 
expanded patent protection to genetically modified traits in Ex Parte Hibberd16. In 
2001, the US Supreme Court held for the first time in in J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. 
                                                          
11
 See ETC Group, Who will control the Green Economy? (November 2011), available at 
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf_file/ETC_wwctge_4web_Dec201
1.pdf. 
12
 See, our analysis Section 3. 
13
  For a description, see UNIDROIT, Intellectual Property Rights and Contract Farming, Study 80-A – 
Doc. 1 Add. 18 (August 2014), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2014/study80a/wg04/s-80a-01-add18-e.pdf  
14
 Niels P. Louwaars et al., Impacts of Strengthened Intellectual Property Rights Regimes on the Plant 
Breeding Industry in Developing Countries, (World Bank Report, February 2005), available at 
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/LouwaarsCGN_Plants_05.pdf, p. 27. 
15
 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
16
 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Board of Patent Applications and Interferences, 1985). 
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Pioneer that utility patents may be issued for crops and other flowering (sexually 
reproducing) plants and can be combined with plant variety rights protection17. With 
a utility patent, patent-holders can sue farmers and rivals for patent infringement and 
pursue litigation to enforce licensing agreements. Utility patents are routinely used 
for genetically modified traits, traditional germplasm and biotechnology research 
tools. The germplasm consists in the living tissue from which new plants can be 
grown and contains information on the species’ genetic make-up (the hereditary 
material in a plant coded in its DNA). The traits are engineered by insertion of foreign 
genes into the plants. These genes may be single or stacked and usually confer a 
desirable attribute to the seed, for instance herbicide or insect resistance. The 
emergence of IP protection, with an extensive reliance on utility patents, led to a shift 
of the paradigm from public sector innovation to private sector innovation, particularly 
in plant technologies and molecular level agricultural biotechnology18.  
The scope of patentability is more narrowly delineated in Europe, where plant 
varieties and essential biological processes are excluded from patent protection19, 
also in view of the need to avoid a double protection under patent law and the sui 
generis plant variety protection resulting from the UPOV (Union for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants) Convention20.  
However, the European Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions led to the possibility of patenting when the technical 
feasibility of the invention is not confined to a specific plant variety21. In 1999, the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office stated that “(a) patent 
                                                          
17
 J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001). This 
overlapping protection was significant as U.S. Plant variety protection legislation [7 U.S.C. §§ 2543-
2544] conferred “less robust protection than utility patents” as it allows farmers to save seeds for 
replanting and provides for a research exception for private, non-commercial uses of protected seed. 
See, Daryl Lim, Living with Monsanto, (2015) Michigan State Law Review 559, 567. 
18
 Paul W. Heisey, John L. King and Kelly Day Rubenstein, Patterns of Public-Sector and Private-
Sector Patenting in Agricultural Biotechnology, (2005) 8 AGBIOFORUM 73. 
19
 Article 53(b) of the European Patent Convention (EPC). According to this provision, 
"European patents shall not be granted in respect of: […]  (b) plant or animal varieties or 
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals; this provision shall not 
apply to microbiological processes or the products thereof". 
See also, Article 4(1) of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 
1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, OJ 1998 L 213/13, which stipulates that 
“essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals” “shall not be patentable”.  
20
 International Convention of the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Ger.-Neth.-U.K., Dec. 2, 
1961, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 (revised Nov. 10, 1972, Oct. 23, 1978 and Mar. 19, 1991). 
21
 Article 4(2) of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on 
the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, OJ 1998 L 213/13. According to Article 2 of 
Directive 98/44/EC, “(a) process for the production of plants or animals is essentially biological if it 
consists entirely of natural phenomena such as crossing or selection”. 
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cannot be granted for a single plant variety but can be granted if varieties may fall 
within the scope of its claims”22. Indeed, according to Recital 31 of the Biotechnology 
Directive, “a plant grouping which is characterised by a particular gene (and not its 
whole genome) is not covered by the protection of new varieties and is therefore not 
excluded from patentability even if it comprises new varieties of plants”. Plant 
varieties may also fall within the scope of patent claims when they are the direct 
product of a patented non-biological technical process.  
The most recent jurisprudence of the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) of the 
EPO has reduced even further the patentability exception enshrined in Article 53(b) 
EPC, even for a patent claim for a product that is directly obtained and/or defined by 
an “essentially biological process”. The EBA held that “the fact that the only method 
available at the filing date for generating the claimed subject-matter is an essentially 
biological process for the production of plants disclosed in the patent application 
does not render a patent claim directed to plants or plant material other than a plant 
variety unallowable”.23 In essence, the EBA found that the patentability exception in 
Article 53(b) EPC for “essentially biological processes for the production of plants” 
had to be interpreted narrowly and did not extend beyond the excluded processes in 
order to cover products defined or obtained by such processes. Hence, a product 
resulting from an “essentially biological process for the production of plants or 
animals” may be patented as long as (i) the patentability requirements (novelty, 
inventive step, industrial application) are satisfied, (ii) the claim defines the product to 
be covered, either in a product format or in a product-by-process format, and (iii) the 
patent does not claim a single plant variety, which is something that is explicitly 
excluded from the scope of patentability under Article 53(b) EPC.  
                                                          
22
 Transgenic Plant/NOVARTIS II, G 001/98 [2000] OJ 111. 
23
 Enlarged Board of Appeal, EPO, Appeal number T 1242/06, Case G 0002/12, Tomato II (March 25, 
2015); Enlarged Board of Appeal, EPO, Appeal number T 0083/05 - 3.3.04, Case G 0002/13, Broccoli 
II (March 25, 2015). It is noteworthy that the Enlarged Board of Appeal emphasized that “there is no 
general notion of an obligatorily restrictive construction of exceptions to patentability, for example, 
such as that adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) when insisting on a 
narrow interpretation of exceptions to or derogations from fundamental EC Treaty principles 
embodied in the four freedoms” (case G002/13, p. 41). Hence, the exclusion of patentability 
incorporated in Article 53(b) EPC of “essentially biological processes for the production of plants” 
does not cover any product of such a process, but only excludes biological breeding processes sensu 
stricto. 
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This is a very favourable position for large agrochemical corporations24 and 
contrasts with the more restrictive approach followed by some EU member States’ 
patent legislation, which exclude product claims from patentability where the claimed 
products have been generated by an essentially biological process for the protection 
of plants25. 
Opportunities for access to proprietary knowledge through IP law are 
generally limited. The EU biotechnology directive includes the possibility of 
compulsory cross-licensing for non-exclusive use where a breeder cannot acquire or 
exploit a plant variety right without infringing a prior patent, inasmuch as the licence 
is necessary for the exploitation of the plant variety to be protected. This is subject to 
payment of an appropriate royalty on reasonable terms26. Nevertheless, the 
conditions to apply for compulsory cross-licensing are quite restrictive, as applicants 
must show that “(a) they have applied unsuccessfully to the holder of the patent or of 
the plant variety right to obtain a contractual licence; (b) the plant variety or the 
invention constitutes significant technical progress of considerable economic interest 
compared with the invention claimed in the patent or the protected plant variety”27. 
According to the TRIPS agreement, every country must have at least sui 
generis protection for plants. Article 27.3(b) allows WTO members to exclude “plants 
and animals other than micro-organisms and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants and animals other than biological and microbiological 
processes”, provided that they offer patents or establish “an effective sui generis 
system” of protection for plant varieties. Yet, the WTO stays short in defining 
precisely what constitutes an “effective sui generis system”.  
Many jurisdictions protect plant varieties through the UPOV (Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants) Convention, which was adopted in 1961, in 
                                                          
24
 See, the discussion in Timo Minssen & Ana Nordberg, The Impact of Brocolli II & Tomato II on 
European patents in conventional vreeding, GMO’s and Synthetic Biology: The grand finale of a juicy 
patents tale?, (2015) 34 (3) Biotechnology Law Report 81-98. 
25
 Enlarged Board of Appeal, EPO, Appeal number T 0083/05 - 3.3.04, Case G 0002/13, Broccoli II 
(March 25, 2015), pp. 64-65 [Part VIII(2)6d] referring to recent amendments to this effect in the 
German Patent Act of 1936 (as amended in 2013) and in the Dutch Patent Act 1995 (as amended in 
2014). However, as the EBA noted, “no such amendments have been made in […] the United 
Kingdom, […] France […] Austria […] and Switzerland”. It remains to be seen if the Court of Justice of 
the EU will adopt such a narrow interpretation of the exclusion of patentability of products deriving 
from essentially biological processes, when interpreting the exclusion rule under Article 4(1) of the 
Biotechnology Directive, the CJEU not being bound by the EBA jurisprudence. 
26
 Article 12, Article 4(2) of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 
1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, OJ 1998 L 213/13. 
27
 Ibid. 
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order to safeguard the interests of farmers and breeders with exemptions permitting 
farmers to save seed from one growing season to another and allowing breeders to 
use protected seeds for research purposes28. UPOV is an intergovernmental 
organization, most of its members being developed industrialised countries, which 
administers common rules for the recognition and protection of plant variety 
protection globally. Plant variety rights constituted the main form of sui generis IP 
protection until the U.S. Supreme Court opened the possibility in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty for living organisms, such as germplasm and GM traits to constitute 
patentable subject matter.  
Like patents, plant variety protection provides patent-like rights to plant 
breeders. These sui generis IPRs protect the genetic makeup of a specific plant 
variety, the criteria for protection being novelty, distinctness, uniformity and stability. 
Plant variety protection confers a bundle of rights to the developer of a novel 
combination of genes manifested as a distinct, uniform, and stable variety (the 
phenotype of the variety), without any need to prove an inventive step nor a specific 
utility, as title is provided solely on the evaluation of the variety’s value in terms of 
genetic quality.  
Although plant variety protection laws can provide exemptions for breeders, 
allowing them to use protected varieties for further breeding, and for farmers, 
allowing them to save seeds from their harvest, these exceptions are provided under 
highly restricted conditions and these regimes have become more and more similar 
to the protection provided by patents, in particular since the 1991 UPOV Convention.  
The boundaries of these IP rights have also been broadly interpreted. In 
Erawu-Jacquery v La Hesbignonne, the Court of Justice of the EU held that a 
prohibition on the sale or export of basic seeds by the IP right holder was not subject 
to Article 101 TFEU since considerable investment had been made in developing the 
basic seed. According to the Court, “a person who has made considerable efforts to 
develop varieties of basic seed which may be the subject-matter of plant breeders' 
rights must be allowed to protect himself against any improper handling of those 
                                                          
28
 International Convention of the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Ger.-Neth.-U.K., Dec. 2, 
1961, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 (revised Nov. 10, 1972, Oct. 23, 1978 and Mar. 19, 1991). 
 
 
11 
 
varieties of seed” and “to that end, the breeder must be entitled to restrict 
propagation to the growers which he has selected as licensees”29.  
The plant variety protection rights have also been implemented in developing 
countries and emergent economies, under direct or indirect pressure from developed 
countries, in the context of bilateral trade and investment agreements containing an 
obligation for developing countries to embrace UPOV rules.  
It has been noted, that many developing countries’ governments were critical 
of IPRs protection in the area of biological resources, “partly because of their own 
(varied) national histories of community ownership of biological resources and partly 
because patenting has become a central mechanism for the capture (and 
exploitation by developed country-based corporations) of natural resources and their 
genetic materials”30.  
Implementation of the UPOV rules and other forms of IPRs protection in the 
sphere of biological resources in the developing countries highlights an important 
tension between different approaches to incentivising innovation in this area. 
Traditional approaches based on principles of sharing and open access to 
knowledge run into conflict with an exclusionary approach based on privatization of 
genetic information and controlled methods of production.  
We can see, for instance, in the case of India that the scope of IPRs 
protection in the area of biological resources has been interpreted differently so as to 
provide increased opportunities of access to genetic information. India’s (the 
Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act 2001, or hereinafter PVPFR 
Act), which became fully operational in 2007, requires that the breeder or any other 
person entitled to produce, market and sell the seeds of a registered variety must 
make such seeds or propagating materials available to farmers “in a timely manner” 
in order to “satisfy their requirements” and “at a reasonable market price”31. A 
number of provisions in the PVPFR Act directly or indirectly recognize specific rights 
of, or grant entitlements to, farmers and the farming community32. Farmers have the 
                                                          
29
 Case 27/87 SPRL Louis Erauw-Jacquery v La Hesbignonne SC [1988] ECR 1919. See also, Case 
258/78, Nungesser v. Commission [1982] ECR 2015, para. 10. 
30
 Christopher May and Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical History (Lynne Rienner 
Pub, London, 2006), p. 191. 
31
 Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Rules, 2003 (as amended in 2012), Rule 36A. 
32
 For a description see Sujith Koonan,  India’s sui generis system of plant variety protection, (January 
2014), available at http://www.quno.org/sites/default/files/resources/QUNO%20India%20-
%20plant%20variety%20protection%20-%202014.pdf. 
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right to ‘save, use, sow, resow, exchange, share or sell’ farm produce including seed 
of a protected variety in the same manner as they were entitled to prior to the 
PVPFR Act, without however that involving the right to sell branded seed of a 
protected variety. Farmers are also entitled to recognition and reward in cases where 
the genetic material they preserved and improved is used in developing new 
varieties. Farmers have the right to claim compensation from the breeder, if the 
variety they purchased fails to perform as per the disclosure made by the breeder. 
Finally, they are immune from infringement legal action, if such infringement was 
innocent.  
Most importantly, the Authority in charge of the implementation of the Act is 
empowered to issue a compulsory license after three years of registration, if the 
breeder fails to satisfy the reasonable requirements of the public for the seed or 
other propagating material or that the seed or propagating material has not been 
made available to the public at a reasonable price.  
The effects of UPOV protection on the quality or diversity of plant varieties is a 
matter for investigation, much commercial breeding being directed at cosmetic 
changes in order to serve market strategies. 
 IP right holders may also take measures in order to avoid problems with 
regard to the implementation of their IP rights, in particular in developing jurisdictions 
with weak IP enforcement systems. Material Transfer Agreements between the IP 
right holders and farmers may specify the conditions under which a seed sample will 
be exchanged. Those holding utility patent rights in seed may sell subject to a 
contractual provision that bars the farmer from saving seed and using it to grow 
another generation of crops, thus controlling farmers through purchase agreements.  
An example is Monsanto’s Roundup Ready ® Technology Agreement that 
usually provides that the farmer cannot save seed or any other part of the crop 
grown from the Monsanto seed for replanting and that the farmer is prohibited from 
supplying seed to any other person. Violation of these licenses may be regarded as 
a breach of contract subject to draconic sanctions, the farmer being obliged to pay 
120 times the technology fee plus the legal fee if he/she is caught violating the 
agreement. Enforcement of these contractual clauses involves the continuous 
inspection of the farmers’ fields by Monsanto’s staff. Binding arbitration constitutes a 
default dispute resolution mechanism.  
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One may consider these contractual limitations of traditional farmer seed 
saving and sharing practices as introducing a restriction to research and seed 
development by farmers and thus a restriction on innovation. Monsanto may 
advance that such restrictions are necessary in order to protect its own incentives to 
innovate, due to its investment in R&D to develop the technology and the need to 
recoup the costs by the appropriation of the profits arising out of the productivity 
improvements introduced by its innovative effort. 
 The seed industry has also put in place biological tools to protect its IP rights 
by developing hybridization, or more recently through cytoplasmic male sterility, one 
of the most efficient ways to produce F1 (the first filial generation of offspring of 
distinctly different parental types) hybrid seeds. Another biological protection is 
Genetic Use Restriction Technology (GURT), with the development of terminator 
technologies preventing farmers from saving seeds since the genetically engineered 
plants will not germinate in subsequent generations or will not express the specific 
trait (e.g. herbicide resistance) that is protected by IP rights, unless the plant is 
sprayed with specific chemicals in order to activate the right gene. These biological 
protection instruments are particularly useful in jurisdictions with weak enforcement 
of IPRs.  
These technologies are protected by patents, a great number of them being 
held by few global seed companies. This IP-based business environment makes it 
quite difficult for public institutions to assert themselves in the process of innovation 
in the seed industry and promote the open access and sharing ethos that was 
prevalent prior to the expansion of IPRs in this sector of activity. These IP rights 
related strategies had an impact on the development of a concentrated structure for 
various factors of production markets and the important consolidation of the seed 
industry following a wave of M&A activity. 
 
III. The development of a concentrated market 
 
We will focus on the M&A activity of global seed players, before exploring the 
level of concentration in this market. This concentration is not only limited to seeds. It 
is also reported that the 10 biggest pesticide firms now control 90% of the global 
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pesticide market, that 10 companies control 76% of the animal pharmaceutical sales, 
and that 10 animal feed companies control 52% of the global animal market33.  
The increasing consolidation of the inputs market may raise important public 
policy concerns, in particular as the share of the total surplus value appropriated by 
the farmers has considerably fallen. This may be of concern in particular for 
jurisdictions not disposing of sophisticated state subsidies regimes enabling some 
transfer of resources to poorer rural communities, highly dependent on agriculture.  
 
A. M&A activity of global seed players 
 
We analysed mergers and acquisition activity of the global seed industry leaders 
(Monsanto, Syngenta). We used S&P Capital IQ database to conduct our analysis, a 
recognized M&A intelligence tool34 which maintains a database of global M&A 
transactions and other financial information and provides analytics35.  
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 1 (Monsanto), Table 2 
(Syngenta), and Table 3 (DuPont Pioneer Hi-Bred). Although the number of  targets 
is the same for Monsanto and Syngenta, our analysis shows that Monsanto was 
acquiring much bigger targets, spending on M&A almost six times more (USD 
11.9bn vs USD 2bn for Syngenta). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33
 ETC, Who will Control the Green Economy? (November 2011), available at 
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf_file/ETC_wwctge_4web_Dec201
1.pdf. 
34
 S&P Capital IQ is a part of McGraw Hill Financial, Inc., a leading provider of data, research and 
analytics (http://www.spcapitaliq.com/). 
35
 For our analysis we counted only mergers and acquisition deals but did not include capital raising 
deals (private placement, public offering), share buybacks, spin-offs and split-offs. We concentrated 
mostly on completed deals (marked as “closed”), and tried to exclude internal deals (i.e., where 
transactions were held between headquarters and subsidiaries or within subsidiaries). For Monsanto 
and DuPont Pioneer Hi-Bred we covered a period from 1995 till February 20, 2016; for Syngenta a 
period between 2000 and February 20, 2016. In addition to S&P Capital IQ we also used corporate 
press releases as well as other publicly available information. Since for some transactions of 
Monsanto, Syngenta, and Du Pont Pioneer financial values remain undisclosed, the figures in Table 
1-3 are based on publicly available information for deals with disclosed data. 
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Table 1. Mergers and acquisitions of Monsanto (1995-2015) 
 
  
1995-
2005 
2006-
2010 
2010-
2015 Subtotal 
Number of Deals  10 11 9 30 
of which         
seeds, ag. products (crops, 
cereals, etc.) 9 9 1 19 
fertilizers / pesticides / chemicals  - - 1 1 
biotech products - - 5 5 
other (IT, peat, distribution, animal 
feed, etc.) 1 2 2 5 
Total transaction volume*, USDm   6 974,77    3 486,85    1 519,0  11 980,62 
 
        
 
Table 2. Mergers and acquisitions of Syngenta (2000-2015) 
 
  
2000-
2005 
2006-
2010 
2011-
2015 Subtotal 
Number of Deals  6 16 8 30 
of which         
seeds, agriculture products (crops, 
cereals, etc.) 5 11 4 20 
traditional fertilizers / pesticides / 
chemicals  - - - - 
biotech (pesticides, other) - 1 2 3 
others (IT, peat, distribution, animal 
feed, etc.) 1 4 2 7 
Total transaction volume*, USDm 654,28 607,62 741,57 2 003,47 
 
Table 3. Mergers and acquisitions of DuPont Pioneer (1995-2015) 
 
  
1995-
2005 
2006-
2010 
2011-
2015 Subtotal 
Number of Deals  1 10 1 12 
of which         
seeds, agriculture products (crops, 
cereals, etc.) 1 7 1 9 
traditional fertilizers / pesticides / 
chemicals  - - - - 
biotech (pesticides, other) - 1 - 1 
others (IT software) - 2 - 2 
Total transaction volume*, USDm n/a n/a n/a   
*based on publicly disclosed 
information         
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Prior to emergence of Syngenta in 1999, from 1995 till 2000 Monsanto kept itself 
busy by actively consolidating the market via acquisitions of leading players such as 
Dekalb Genetics (USD 2.2bn), Cargill Seeds Operations (USD 1.4bn), and other 
recognized players in the area of corn, sunflower, soybean and cotton seeds. Over 
the period of 2000-2010 Monsanto continued to acquire leading players of the seed 
market often with a market capitalization close to or exceeding a billion US dollars, 
i.e. Seminis (USD 1,7bn; 2005), Delta and Pine Land Company (USD 1,6bn; 2006), 
De Ruiter Seeds Group (0,86bn; 2008).  
A notable exception from a series of seeds targets was a recent acquisition of 
the Climate Corporation (USD 0,93bn, 2013). The company is known for producing 
software and hardware as well as insurance products for farmers for weather 
monitoring and agronomic modelling. The size of the transaction indicates a serious 
bet by Monsanto in the diversification of its business model into IT-type of services. 
A number of transactions over the period of 2010-2015 were marked as biotech 
(microbes, microRNA technology, small molecule pharmacology, synthetically 
derived vaccines and anti-microbials, ribonucleic acid interference products, etc.). 
In 2015 Monsanto announced a USD 45bn bid to acquire Syngenta. The bid 
was rejected by Syngenta shareholders. It was estimated that the merged company 
could alone control 45% of the commercial seed market and a 30% share of 
pesticides market (based on 2014 financial reports)36.  
Syngenta emerged as a spin-off, after the merger between the agrochemical 
business of pharmaceutical corporation AstraZeneca and the seeds and crop 
protection business of Novartis. Between 2000 and 2015 Syngenta continued steady 
M&A activity; however the company pursued smaller size targets compared to 
Monsanto. Its biggest deal was acquisition of a Belgian biotech company Devgen 
(closed in 2014) for USD 512,6m. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International was acquired by El DuPont de Nemours & Co in 
1999. Since then this division manages the agriculture business of Dupont. By the 
end of 2014 the annual net sales figure of the division reached almost USD 11.3bn. 
Unlike its rivals, mostly Monsanto and Syngenta, Pioneer Hi-Bred was less 
acquisitive. We identified 11 deals where Pioneer was buyer of the seeds assets 
                                                          
36
  Jacob Bunge and Andrew Morse, Monsanto Makes Bid to go Big in Pesticides, Wall Street Journal, 
(8 May 2015), available at  http://www.wsj.com/articles/syngenta-rejects-unsolicited-monsanto-
acquisition-proposal-1431069142.  
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(Table 3). Most acquisitions were announced in 2008-2011 and completed in 2010-
2014. Two of the acquisitions are software deals (Farms Technology,LLC which 
provides Internet-based procurement applications and Map Shots, Inc., which is 
active in precision agriculture software sales). 
The majority of DuPont Pioneer’s transactions (9 out of 11 deals) are 
acquisitions of seeds producers: two of them based in India, one in South Africa, and 
the rest were US incorporated seed companies.  In 2008 DuPont launched the 
PROaccess platform which enables the company to sell its seeds to more growers 
through a network of distributors via special distribution agreements. Over the period 
2008-2011, Pioneer acquired many of its partners of PROaccess platform including 
AgVenture, Hoegemeyer Hybrids, NuTech Seed, Seed Consultants, Terral Seed (all 
deal announced in 2010), and Doebler’s Pennsylvania Hybrids (2011). No 
transaction data was disclosed on any of DuPont’s deals.  
Interestingly, Pioneer Hi-Bred was more involved in divestments than in 
acquisitions over the period under review. In 2014 the company sold pesticides 
business assets to its rivals such as Bayer, Sumimoto Chemicals, Mitsui, S&W 
Seed, and Syngenta. Over the last 5 years Pioneer continued to sell pesticides and 
chemical assets while acquiring mostly seeds companies. 
This less active M&A strategy compared to Monsanto and Syngenta may be 
contrasted to the activity of DuPont Pioneer in filing patent applications. According to 
a recent study of Jefferson et al (2015), DuPont (together with its affiliates) is a 
global leader in plant-related IP rights portfolio (i.e., in utility patents for maize, rice 
and soybean plants), far exceeding the rest of the US industry, which includes small 
biotech companies, governmental research institutes, and universities, followed by 
Monsanto and other industry players37.  
Over the past six months two historic events for the agrichemical markets 
were announced. The first one relates to the merger between the Dow Chemical 
Company and DuPont, which was announced on December 11, 2015. According to 
the press-release, “the combined company will be named DowDuPont and have a 
combined market capitalization of approximately $130 billion at announcement…The 
                                                          
37
 Osmat A. Jefferson, Deniz Kollhofer, Thomas H. Ehrich & Richard A. Jeferson. The ownership 
question of plant gene and genome intellectual properties. Nature Biotechnology, Vol. 33, #11. 
November 2015 
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transaction is expected to deliver approximately $3 billion in cost synergies”38. 
Following the merger, the company will be separated into three independent, publicly 
traded companies, in agrichemicals, materials science, and speciality products. The 
new agrichemicals company will possess combined DuPont’s and Dow’s seeds and 
crop protection businesses with total revenues approximating USD 19 billion, and 
would sell about 41% of U.S. corn seeds and related genetics.39  
Following the announcement of the DuPont Dow merger, another mega-deal 
was announced between Syngenta and ChemChina (on February 3, 2016 
ChemChina made an offer to acquire Syngenta’s shares). Headquartered in Beijing, 
ChemChina is the largest chemical corporation in China with net sales in excess of 
USD 39bn. Syngenta’s sales figures exceeded USD 13.4bn in 2015. A combined 
company will have an estimated revenue of about USD 17bn (counting only seed 
and pesticides division), making it the second largest global player on the agricultural 
market. The DowDuPont Agriculture business spin-off would become the global 
leader40. The deal highlights China’s ambition about food security and its dedication 
and persistence to get access to modern technologies. The merger has been viewed 
as a win-win transaction for Syngenta as well, given the great opportunities for the 
Swiss-based company arising from a growing demand in the food market in China.  
Should these transactions close successfully, Monsanto, whose bid for 
Syngenta’s acquisition was rejected by Syngenta’s shareholders in 2015, will move 
from the leading position it currently holds to the third position in terms of revenue 
size.  
This will bring down the number of major global companies producing crop 
seeds and pesticides from 6 to 4 and transform an already concentrated industry to a 
tight oligopoly on a global scale. 
  
                                                          
38
 Companies press-release, http://www.dow.com/news/press-
releases/dupont%20and%20dow%20to%20combine%20in%20merger%20of%20equals 
39
 Jacob Bunge et al., Dow Chemical Agree to Merge, the Break Up into Three Companies, Wall 
Street Journal, (11 December 2015), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/dupont-dow-chemical-
agree-to-merge-1449834739.  
40
 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-03/chemchina-offers-to-purchase-syngenta-for-
record-43-billion 
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B. Industry concentration 
 
The analysis of the seed M&A activity the last 15 years provides a good sense of the 
magnitude of the consolidation trend in the seed industry.  
High concentration in the food industry is not unusual. This phenomenon has 
been extensively studied over the last several years. Hoppe and Banker argue that 
80 to 90 percent of US food production is produced by 10 to 20 percent of farmers41. 
The US food processing sector is also highly concentrated42: according to the 
Economic Research Service (ERS), 12 percent of plants with more than 100 
employees ship 77 percent of all value of food in the US food manufacturing 
industry43. Macdonald and McBride indicate that the top four beef processing 
companies’ share of the US slaughter market increased from 36 to 79 percent over 
the period 1980-200544.  
Vertical integration is a key trend in many food chain subsectors when key 
players transform themselves through a series of strategic moves to diversify their 
business. A notable example is the US poultry industry which experienced vertical 
integration trends where few integrators (companies that own feeding, hatching, and 
processing poultry) have market power over poultry growers45. 
However the level of concentration of the seed industry is remarkable even 
considering traditionally high food sector concentration. Howard argues that the rapid 
consolidation of the seed industry led to global dominance by a few companies, with 
Monsanto, Syngenta and DuPont being the most powerful of them46. As a result, the 
four firm concentration ratio (CR4) in the crop seeds sector has reached 54 percent 
                                                          
41
 Robert A. Hoppe and David E. Banker, Structure and finances of U.S. farms – Family Farm Report, 
EIB-66. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, (2010). 
42
 Malden M. Nesheim, Maria Oria and Peggy Tsai Yin (eds.), A Framework for Assessing Effects of 
the Food System. National Academy of Sciences (2015), available at http://nycfoodpolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/A-Framework-for-Assessing-Effects-of-the-Food-System.pdf. 
43
 Economic Research Service Manufacturing, (2014), available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-markets-
prices/processingmarketing/manufacturing.aspx#.Uvowa_vwv3t (accessed November 24, 2014).  
44
 James M. MacDonald and William D. McBride, The transformation of U.S. livestock agriculture: 
Scale, efficiency and risks, (2009) U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 
Economic Information Bulletin 43. 
45
 Malden M. Nesheim, Maria Oria and Peggy Tsai Yin (eds.), A Framework for Assessing Effects of 
the Food System, National Academy of Sciences (2015), p. 53. 
46
 Philip H. Howard, Visualizing consolidation in the global seed industry: 1996-2008, (2009) 
Sustainability 
1(4):1266-1287; Philip H. Howard, Seed industry structure, (2014), available at 
https://msu.edu/~howardp/seedindustry.html. 
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according to a recent US National Academy of Sciences Report47. Fuglie et al. have 
demonstrated that few leaders in such industries as agricultural chemicals, farm 
machinery and animal breeding have more than 50% of the global market sales48. 
The latest estimates suggest that “the Big Six” (Monsanto, Syngenta, DuPont, BASF, 
Bayer, Dow) collectively control more than 75% of the global agrochemical market, 
63% of the commercial seed market, and almost three quarters of R&D expenses in 
the seeds and pesticides sector (the combined R&D budget of the Big Six increased 
USDA crop science research budget more than 15 times in 2013)49. The same is 
true for the farm equipment sector where the top three companies (Deere & Co, 
CNH, AGCO) control 49% market share (201350). 
The EU authorities are also increasingly concerned about the high 
concentration of the EU seed market. As argued by Mammana, contrary to the 
opinion that there are almost 7,000 seed companies operating on the EU seed 
market51, there is considerable variation from country to country and market niche52. 
For instance, a single company controls 45 percent of the wheat market in the UK; 
while 5 companies control 95% of the EU vegetable seed market. The maize seed 
sector is a vital part of the EU seed market accounting for 26%. It is controlled by 5 
companies whose collective market share amounts to 51.4%: the maize varieties of 
DuPont Pioneer accounting for a 12.2% market share, Syngenta for 11.5%, 
Limagrain for 9,7%, Monsanto for 8,95%, and KWS for 8,9%, from a total of 4 975 
maize varieties registered in the European Common Catalogue53. According to the 
                                                          
47
 Malden M. Nesheim, Maria Oria and Peggy Tsai Yin (eds.), A Framework for Assessing Effects of 
the Food System, National Academy of Sciences (2015), p. 54. 
48
 Keith Fuglie et al., Rising concentration in agricultural input industries influences new farm 
technologies, (2012) 10(4) Amber Waves 1-6, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-
waves/2012-december/rising-concentration-in-agricultural-input-industries-influences-new-
technologies.aspx#.VpYe1-9unct.  
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 ETC Group, Breaking Bad: Big Ag Mega-Mergers in Play, (December 2015), Communique 115, 
available at http://www.etcgroup.org/content/breaking-bad-big-ag-mega-mergers-play, p.4.  
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 Ibid., p. 8.  
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 Official controls: Impact on food business operators - seeds and plants, the European Seed 
Association’s presentation to the European Parliament, 14 October 2013, 
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_/envi20131014_doc14_biloni_en.pdf.  
52
 Ivan Mammana, Concentration of Market Power in the EU Seed Market, (January 2014), Study 
commissioned by the Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament.  
53
 Ivan Mammana, Concentration of Market Power in the EU Seed Market, (January 2014), Study 
commissioned by the Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament.  
 
 
21 
 
report of the European Parliament, EU farmers faced increases in prices of seeds 
and planting stock by 30% between 2000 and 201054. 
 
IV. Competition dynamics in the seed industry 
 
The significant transformation of the industry has led to the development of a 
different competitive interaction between the various players. We will examine the 
shift in the M&A activity of global seeds players, before commenting on their growth 
acceleration strategies that are essential in order to understand the new competitive 
game. 
 
A. Global seeds players: a shift in strategy 
 
The results of the conducted analysis of M&A activity show (notably with regard to  
Monsanto) a shift in strategy from seeds acquisitions to acquisitions in the biotech 
and IT sectors. In biotech, the companies are rapidly developing microbial products 
which can either become complementary to the existing products or serve as a 
replacement of traditional chemistry (i.e., pesticides products)55. The global 
pesticides industry accounts for USD 54,2bn (2013) and continues to grow steadily 
up to USD 75.9bn by 201956.  
Microbial products are a new opportunity and potentially a game changer and a 
disrupting technology at the global scale. Although currently the industry is still in its 
infancy (less than USD 2bn of global sales in 2014), going forward it represents a 
huge potential, especially given the growing demand for organic farming globally.  
Realizing this, in 2014 Monsanto announced an alliance known as BIOAG 
Alliance with Novozymes, one of leaders in biotech industry. Novozymes is 
responsible for the production of the microbial products while Monsanto serves as 
                                                          
54
 Report of the European Parliament on the farm input supply chain: structure and implications 
2011/2114(INI), rapporteur José Bové, available at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-042 
1&language=EN 
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 Robb Fraley, Citi 2014 Basic Materials Conference, (3 December 2014), available at 
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the lead for field testing, registration, and commercialization for the Alliance’s 
products57. 
A clear diversification move for global leaders is happening in the so-called 
“digital agriculture” market. Precision agriculture (or “precision farming”) is a global 
trend that is rapidly growing. By precision farming experts understand a data 
analysis at the level of the square meter or even smaller to optimize the consumption 
of inputs (seeds, water, fertilizers, pesticides, etc.), and to monitor the actual process 
of production.58 Precision agriculture, for instance, may use sensors to collect 
information from soil (various parameters such as the level of moisture, fertilizers 
and pesticides, soil organic matter, various soil properties such as bulk density, 
texture, compaction, etc.), and satellite images about crop growth progress. It then 
would combine all information and use big data algorithms to analyse it, applying 
sophisticated mathematical models to plan and adjust in real-time for needed inputs 
to maximize the eventual crop yield.  
Precision agriculture is expected to revolutionize farming on a global scale within 
the next 10-15 years. The leading companies are rapidly enhancing this 
competency. A recent acquisition of the Climate Corporation by Monsanto is a bet to 
diversify beyond the traditional seeds and pesticides business model. The software 
developed by the Climate Corporation is aimed to become a powerful decision-
support system and a crop progress monitoring tool for a typical farmer59. Combined 
with the existing product portfolio of Monsanto (seeds, traditional and bio-pesticides, 
etc.), the data analysis and recommendation tool of the Climate Corporation will 
enable Monsanto to become an ultimate one stop-shop opportunity for a farmer. 
Monsanto intends to sell subscription to the software as a stand-alone service on a 
global scale. The other “big six” of the seeds industry – Syngenta, DuPont Pioneer, 
Bayer, BASF, and Dow – are rapidly catching up by developing their own IT-
platforms60.  
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 BIOAG Alliance Fact Sheet, available at http://www.novozymes.com/en/about-
us/brochures/Documents/BioAg-Alliance-factsheet.pdf. 
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 Boston Consulting Group, Crop farming 2030: the reinvention of the sector, (2015), available at 
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B. The growth accelerators of global seeds producers 
 
The growth engine of a corporation (how companies grow, what causes rapid 
growth) has long been one of the most fascinating topics for scholars studying 
corporate strategy and general management, although its lessons are still relatively 
unclear. One of the possible explanations of corporate growth engine worth studying 
was proposed by Achi et al. and is known as “growth cycles / accelerators”61. Achi et 
al. studied 9450 publicly listed companies to find 41 companies that have grown 
dramatically over the previous ten years (growth rates in excess of 20 percent). They 
suggested that increasing returns driven by positive feedback loops are at the core 
of successfully growing companies. A number of generic self-reinforcing feedback 
loops common to the companies that experienced superior growth rates over a long 
time period was identified. The authors suggested that corporate management 
needs to combine several growth accelerators to win market share, lock-in 
customers, and eventually to get sustainable performance over a long timescale. 
The topic of corporate growth mechanisms through feedback loops and its 
implications for strategic management was discussed in the works of Morecroft 
(1985)62, Lyneis (1999)63, Sterman (2000)64, Warren (200465, 200866), Casadesus-
Masanell, and Ricart (200767), among others.  
In our opinion, this is a useful methodology for the analysis of the emergence 
of the global seed leaders over the last three decades. We think that considering the 
active mergers and acquisitions policy conducted by the “Big Six” as the only 
explanation of their rapid development is insufficient. Top factors that shaped the 
seed industry include: (1) consolidation, (2) R&D spending, (3) early adoption of the 
use of new promising genetics technology (i.e., RNA inhibition allowing selective 
control and the expression of individual genes), (4) vertical integration, (5) network 
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externalities (sale of complementary products in addition to seeds – i.e., Monsanto’s 
corn seeds and “Roundup Ready”), (6) economies of scale from market expansion, 
and (7) product differentiation (seeds, pesticides, IT cloud-based decision support 
systems). Such factors are the core growth accelerators based on reinforcing 
feedback loops. Other accelerators fuelling the corporate engine of global seed and 
agriculture chemistry producers include IP rights protection, patent alliances to swap 
traits, market power resulting from increasing lobbying opportunities, etc.   
A mechanism of gaining a competitive advantage through key growth 
accelerators is examined in more detail below (Pictures 1-3) using a methodology of 
casual loops diagrams of system dynamics68.  
 
 Picture 1.  
 
The most common growth accelerators for leading seed companies come from state-
of-the-art  research and development efforts resulting in advanced technologies (i.e., 
RNA inhibition, etc.), and products with a superior quality over competitors (i.e., 
seeds with higher yields or advanced resistance to insects), as well as substantial 
spending on marketing & distribution channels (Picture 1). A diversified pipeline of 
high quality products increases the attractiveness of a company’s products to 
customers, thus increasing customer base, driving sales and revenues. Higher 
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revenues allow strong R&D and marketing budgets, thus forming a powerful 
feedback loop based on the economic concept of increasing returns.  
 
 
Picture 2. 
 
As a company grows in size, it gets access to favorable capital raising 
options, thus enhancing opportunities for M&A (Picture 2). Through acquisitions of 
promising start-ups or rivals with high potential products or advanced technologies 
the company adds to the existing product pipeline, driving further sales and 
revenues. This is another self-reinforcing growth cycle that was successfully 
employed by global seed and agrochemical companies over the last 20 years. 
The market power of the “Big Six” is further enhanced by the cross-licencing 
agreements for genetically modified seed traits between Monsanto, Syngenta, 
Bayer, DuPont, BASF and Dow69. This enables them to create additional barriers to 
entry for new market players by enhancing intellectual property and trait licensing 
agreements (i.e, swap of traits, generic trait agreement to manage regulatory regime 
after expiration of patents) between  them as well as litigating the expiration of 
patents (i.e., peaceful resolution of patent litigation between Monsanto and DuPont 
in 2013). The results obtained by Vergote and Grandjean70 suggest that in some 
                                                          
69
 Philip H. Howard, Intellectual Property and Consolidation in the Seed Industry, (2015) 55(6) Crop 
Science 1-7, available at 
http://www.apbrebes.org/files/seeds/files/Howard_seed_industry_patents_concentration_2015.pdf. 
70
 Woulter Vergote and Gilles J. Grandjean, Network formation among rivals, (2015) CEREC Working 
Papers 2014/9. 
R&D expenses
Products pipeline
Products' advantages
over rivals
Customer base
Sales
Revenues
Marketing and
distribution expenses
Attractiveness of
company's products to
customers
(1) Strong R&D drives
product pipeline of
superior quality
(2) Strong
marketing drives
sales
Company size
Opportunities for
M&A
Mergers & aquisitions
(rivals, promising startups,
etc.)
Advanced
technologies
Capital raising
opportunities
(3) Active M&A policy
drives new products &
technologies
 
 
26 
 
cases such cooperation between rivals may lead to increased barriers to entry for 
those who are not part of the network. An example of such a case has been 
documented by Bekkers et al.71 through the analysis of Motorola’s successful 
attempt to create a group of dominant players in the GSM industry in 1980s through 
cross-licencing agreements. 
 
 
  
Picture 3. 
 
An established customer base serves as an attractiveness anchor for third-
parties (i.e., competitors, leading NGOs, etc.) to cooperate (Picture 3). The 
companies become engaged in alliances and networks for joint R&D opportunities 
(research for new technologies, products – a good example is Monsanto-Novozymes 
alliance), IP-protection issues (cross-licensing agreements, joint patents, competitive 
framework after patent expiration policy, etc.), or major industry initiatives (i.e., 
construction of Svalbard Global Seed Vault).  
As the area under GMO plants continues to expand,72 the area under biotech 
crops increased every year from 1996 to 2014 and accounted for more than 180 
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million hectares in 2014, leading seed production companies increasingly to gain 
market power. Eventually, a combination of several powerful positive feedback loops 
helps industry leaders to de facto lock-in sustainable competitive advantage and 
market dominance. Lobbying opportunities as well as sponsoring of NGOs, various 
interest groups, and the scientific community helps to shape a positive corporate 
image and to sustain market power, thus further maintaining the status quo. 
Combined altogether, the self-reinforcing feedback loops that drive growth 
accelerators for global seed industry leaders help them to create a superior 
competitive advantage over other industry rivals. 
 
V. Implications for competition law and policy 
 
From this perspective, focusing on the level of concentration on a particular segment 
of the market, or ignoring the various sources of market power that the above 
competitive strategies highlight, leads to a myopic competition law and policy. The 
usual competition law tools have not been systematically used in order to deal with 
the resulting bottlenecks, as the competitive dynamics of the development of the 
industry and the consolidation of some key global seeds companies have not been 
clearly understood, and the role of IP rights in these competitive dynamics 
understated.  
Traditionally, competition law has dealt with such unbalances of power by 
reinforcing the bargaining power of farmers so as counter-balance that of other 
segments of the food value chain, downstream but also upstream, by enabling them 
to form agricultural cooperatives. These specific exceptions/regimes have 
nevertheless been under attack lately, as a result of the rise of a specific view of the 
consumer welfare paradigm in competition law. 
  
A. Challenges for competition law enforcement in the seeds industry 
 
Competition law enforcement may engage with the IP practices of seed companies, 
mergers in this area, and different forms of agreements linking the seed producers 
with farmers.  
As explained above, IP rights play an increasing role in the competitive 
dynamics of the seed industry. The owners and developers of patented seed traits 
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may exert considerable market power through cross-licensing agreements with firms 
that want to include the patented technology, in most cases Monsanto traits, in their 
seed products. These cross-licensing agreements between Monsanto and its 
competitors in the seeds market enable the latter to exercise control over the way its 
competitors use the traits.  
Furthermore, Monsanto licensing agreements with farmers typically prohibit 
the traditional practice of saving seeds from harvested crops to plant the next 
season, thus limiting competition from seeds developed by farmers, and eventually 
leveraging their IP right in order to create or enhance market power in markets other 
than that covered by the IP right. Farmers dispose of three sources of buying seed: 
(i) obtain new seeds from seed companies, public institutes and dealers, (ii) save 
part of their own harvest for seeds, and (iii) trade part of their harvest for seed from 
grain dealers73. By signing restrictive licensing agreements seed companies reduce 
farmers’ options and are thus able to raise licensing fees and seed prices for all 
farmers.  
Other possible anticompetitive practices include exclusionary practices, such 
as exclusive dealing arrangements, requiring licensees not to deal with competing 
technology providers, anti-stacking restrictions, and loyalty rebates to seed 
distributors limiting the sales of competing seeds.  
Seed companies also actively implement their IP rights and combat “seed 
piracy”, filing a considerable number of patent infringement cases, even if the 
farmer’s field was only inadvertently contaminated by neighbouring genetically 
modified crops. It is always possible to attach a competition law counterclaim to the 
patent infringement claims brought by the seed company, invoking illegal bundling or 
tying, de facto exclusive dealing, refusal to access to essential facilities doctrine, 
input foreclosure, restrictions to innovation, in particular for restrictions included in 
cross-licensing agreements on the way rival seed companies may stack the 
protected traits with their own traits74. It was, however, noted that these 
counterclaims have been generally unsuccessful75.  
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In Bowman v. Monsanto, the US Supreme Court has also reduced the scope 
of the patent exhaustion doctrine in this industry by holding that the sale of one 
generation of seed does not exhaust rights on later generations. A farmer who 
purchased seed to grow could not sow a new crop using the seeds produced by the 
fist crop - as that, the Court held, would constitute making the patented product and 
not reusing or selling the seed that had been purchased76. Bowman was found to 
infringe two of Monsanto’s patents because he “made” replicas of Monsanto’s 
genetically modified, herbicide-resistant soybean seeds, by simply planting, 
cultivating, harvesting, saving, and then re-planting the patented seeds. IP rights on 
self-replicated seeds are thus not exhausted by the first authorized sale to a farmer.  
Monsanto’s Roundup and Roundup Ready technology has since entered the 
public domain, as the patent expired in 2015, thus enabling competitors to introduce 
a generic version of the trait. However, Monsanto has patented the Genuity™ 
Roundup Ready 2 Yield trait technology, these seeds being protected by a different 
utility patent which will not expire until the end of the next decade. The speed of the 
entry of generics in this market will depend on the access generic seed companies 
may have to Monsanto’s data packages allowing them an advanced development 
and testing. This may raise equivalent competition issues than those routinely 
involved in the competition law enforcement in the pharma sector that led to 
jurisprudence such as FTC v. Actavis in the U.S.,77 and Astra Zeneca in the E.U with 
regard to strategies by incumbent IP holders to block the entry of generics, following 
the expiration of their IP rights78. 
Competition authorities have been marginally more active in the seeds 
industry in the context of merger control. The US DOJ Antitrust Division extracted 
remedies concerning the possible anticompetitive effects of licensing, in a series of 
mergers involving Monsanto acquiring the corn seed company DeKalb or the cotton 
seed companies Delta and Pine Land, where they imposed the condition that 
Monsanto removes anti-stacking restrictions to its licensees, provides wide access 
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through licensing to its germplasm, and divests some of its assets in germplasm and 
seeds79.  
The European Commission has been relatively less active, with only one 
seeds merger case since 2006, Syngenta’s acquisition of Monsanto’s sunflower 
seed business, being subject to remedial conditions. The Commission raised 
concerns over the possible effects of the merger, which would have removed a 
considerable competitor in the market for the commercialisation of sunflower seeds 
in Spain and Hungary. It also expressed concerns with regard to the exchange and 
licensing of sunflower varieties, insofar as the merging parties would be in a position 
to restrict the access of competitors to inputs necessary for the commercialisation of 
sunflower seeds. These would have led to the reduction of innovation, the 
foreclosure of competitors in the markets for the commercialization of sunflower 
seeds, and the reduction of the choice of sunflower seed hybrids for customers. To 
address these concerns, Monsanto agreed to divest its sunflower hybrids as well as 
the parental lines used in the creation of those hybrids, or those currently under 
development for the creation of hybrids for Spain and Hungary80.  
Taking into account the intense M&A activity in this market during the last 
twenty years, this lack of intervention appears intriguing81. This may be due to the 
fact that the existing turnover thresholds in Article 1 of the EU Merger Regulation 
may not catch merger activity in this highly evolving sector, as acquisitions of 
companies that did not achieve high turnover in the past are excluded from 
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consideration82, even if the potential anti-competitive effect of such merger may be 
significant83 and in our view has to be subjected to competition law scrutiny ex ante.  
The economic potential of these merger transactions in terms of the 
possibilities of exercising market power in the future is probably better reflected by 
the purchase price (the transaction value) of these mergers, which is rather high as 
indicated above in view of the turnover made by the acquired targets. Article 22 of 
the EU Merger Regulation establishes a referral system ensuring that Member 
States may refer to the Commission those transactions that fall short of satisfying the 
jurisdictional criteria84. It is noteworthy that the 2006 Syngenta’s acquisition of 
Monsanto’s sunflower seed business, which is the only EU seed merger case we 
identified post 2004, was referred to the Commission following a request from Spain 
and Hungary, pursuant to Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation. 
It is also surprising that out of the 180 cases investigated by National 
Competition Authorities in Europe in the food supply chain between 2004 and 2011, 
the overwhelming majority of those concerned the processing, retail, and 
manufacturing level, only a handful concerned the seed industry85. The factors of 
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production portion of the food supply chain are barely examined in publications by 
Commission officials in charge of competition law enforcement initiatives in the food 
supply chain86.  
Monsanto’s licensing contracts have been found in some jurisdictions to 
provide the company the possibility to influence strategic decisions of licensee 
companies, thus transcending the object of the agreement. By significantly affecting 
the independence between the parties, these contracts were considered as a 
structural change that could be analysed under merger control rules87.  
For instance, the Brazilian Administrative Council for Economic Defence 
(CADE) approved with restrictions four operations involving licensing agreements 
through which Monsanto do Brasil Ltda authorized other companies to develop, 
produce and sell, in Brazil, soybean seeds with Intact RR2 PROTM technology, 
owned by Monsanto. CADE conditioned the approval of the transactions to the 
change of clauses that gave Monsanto the possibility to influence the strategic 
decisions of the licensee companies. This influence did not only reach seed 
production with Intact technology but also extended to the total production of the 
licensee companies.  
The contractual provisions established a compensation mechanism for the 
licensee companies, based on sales of the Intact product and on the sales of 
certified seeds of Monsanto’s competitors. Had a licensee company chosen to 
expand its production by also using a patent from a competing product, the 
compensation from what had been produced with Intact technology would have been 
reduced accordingly. Monsanto’s competitor should have then counterbalanced the 
offer by paying for the correspondent profit reduction.  
The rise of this “contract agriculture”88, the farmers entering into “take it or 
leave it” long-term exchanges with only a few companies controlling germplasm lead 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
sunflower seeds from the companies to whom they sold the final sunflower production; and a sector 
enquiry in Bulgaria on the competitive environment of the markets for production and trade of 
sunflower seeds and oil). 
86
 Philippe Chauve, Antonia Parera and An Renckens, Agriculture, Food and Competition Law: 
Moving the Borders, (2014) 5(5) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 304-313. 
87
 On this case, see Vinicius Marques de Carvallo, Agreements and Competition Enforcement: The 
Choice between Preventive and Repressive Channels, in Barry Hawk (ed.), Annual Proceedings of 
the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (Juris, 2014) 37-47, pp. 41-42. 
88
 Neil E. Hart, The Age of Contract Agriculture: Consequences of concentration in Input Supply, 
(2000) 18(1) Journal of Agribusiness 115-127; James MacDonald et al., Contracts, Markets, and 
Prices: Organizing the Production and Use of Agricultural Commodities, (2004) Agricultural Economic 
Report No. 837 9, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/284610/aer837_1_.pdf . 
 
 
33 
 
to a smaller share of the revenue from production going to the farmer, the lion’s 
share of the revenue ending up with the global seed companies holding the rights to 
the technology involved. One may also note that the effect of these strategies is 
reinforced by the increasing financialisation of agricultural commodities trade, 
financial speculation on agricultural commodities being facilitated by the creation of 
new financial devices with the aim to establish private insurance markets through 
forward trading that would substitute for existing public price-control mechanisms set 
in order to protect farmers from market price fluctuations. However, the development 
of such commodity futures trade triggers price fluctuations through self-reinforcing 
speculation, thus putting the farmers at the mercy of big market actors, in particular 
global seed companies, which develop one-stop shop solution businesses providing 
farmers insurance with regard to their yields89. 
The development of quasi-integrated vertical platforms, through contractual 
licensing restrictions constitutes a significant development in the industry. It has 
been noted that  
“[…] the organization of the transgenic seed industry has shifted 
fundamentally over the past two decades from separate ownership of 
agricultural biotechnology and seed assets to integrated platforms. These 
platforms comprise three major levels: (1) innovation involving genetic 
transformation technologies and genomics; (2) genetic traits that are 
expressed in plant agronomics, including insect resistance (Bt) and herbicide 
tolerance (Ht); and (3) state-of-the-art seeds containing genetic traits, for 
which seed companies are the major distribution channel for ultimate sales to 
farmers. Most current-generation transgenic seeds contain multiple or 
“stacked” genetic trait”90. 
These seed platforms may be established for benign reasons, for instance the 
prospect of economies of coordination that potentially arise from complementarities 
between complex research and development. However, seed platforms may also 
result from a strategy to create or enhance market power through control of patented 
technology and distribution channels for delivering transgenic seeds to farmers91. 
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This has occurred partly because of the expansion of IP rights in this sector, as 
instead of negotiating for the rights to a competitor’s technology, it was simpler, 
cheaper, or more advantageous to acquire the competitor outright.  
There is also a variety of competition models characterizing the industry. As it 
is reported by Diana Moss,  
“[…] two non-mutually exclusive models of competition characterize rivalry in 
transgenic seed--inter-platform and intra-platform competition. In the first 
case, rivalry is between transgenic seed platforms. Seed containing traits that 
are exclusive to a single firm are the product of such platforms. Intra-platform 
competition involves rivalry within platforms whereby firms develop new 
transgenic seed products, in part, by obtaining access to [] patented traits 
[within the platform]. […] What model of competition is likely to produce the 
greatest benefits for competition and consumers poses key a question for 
antitrust enforcement”92. 
Some have argued that these different forms of competition should be reflected in 
the definition of the relevant market, the market for patented traits being defined as a 
separate market than that for traited seed, “when those rights are marketed 
separately from the products in which they are used”93. 
Firms have the choice to either opt for an open system in which different 
complementary assets (such as genetic traits and seed germplasm) interoperate well 
with rival technology, or to develop “closed” platforms. This choice involves 
“fundamental decisions to promote open source versus proprietary technologies, 
“plug-and-play” versus non-standardized components, and tactics that are designed 
to frustrate rivals’ access to needed technology”94. Competition in this context may 
occur between platforms and within platforms.  
Competition authorities should make efforts to promote inter-platform 
competition, but also intra-platform competition. This is important in view of the 
consolidation of the industry and the significant competitive position of some global 
seeds companies which control, through ownership or through a great number of 
cross-licensing or joint-venture agreements, large, totally closed platforms in 
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transgenic seed that may be challenged only by the unlikely emergence of rival 
platforms. This may lead to single-firm dominance and the foreclosure of competitors 
from the access to technology that is critical for intra-platform competition. A 
combination of a more active competition law enforcement ex ante (through merger 
control) as well as ex post (abuse of dominance, anticompetitive agreements) in this 
sector and more government funding for research might promote alternative 
platforms. Furthermore, the development of global commons for germ plasm and 
traits may further develop innovation, while promoting a more competitive market 
structure95. 
Diana Moss explains that as the dominant player in the market for genetic 
trait, Monsanto acquired numerous independent seed companies between the mid-
1990s to late 2000s, beefing up its presence in downstream markets for traited seed 
with the effect that it has been to create vertically integrated platforms of genetic 
traits and traited seed.  In order to stack traits, a developer must combine its own 
traits with those of Monsanto or another rival. In view of Monsanto’s important share 
in genetic traits, the number of possible traits combinations that could be created 
between non-Monsanto developers is limited, with the result that the majority of 
stacked trait combinations contain a Monsanto trait96.  
The possibility of generic competition in transgenic seed, following the end of 
some Monsanto patents is also limited, without the development of an institutional 
structure for promoting and managing generic competition and incentives for the 
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dominant player in this market to facilitate the development of generic products97. 
According to Diana Moss, “(a) myriad of adverse effects potentially flow from this, 
including reduced or lower quality innovation in transgenic seed, higher seed prices 
to farmers (i.e., “technology fees”), fewer transgenic seed choices, and higher 
commodity prices than what would have prevailed under competitive market 
conditions”98.  
Finally, one may add the transformation of farmers from risk-taking 
entrepreneurs that dispose of important incentives to innovate to agents, or simply 
labor, for seed companies, receiving fixed compensation and not incurring any 
significant risks.  This reduces the overall incentives to innovate of a significant 
number of economic operators in this economic sector and eventually limits the 
possibility of applying some competition law provisions to these vertical relations. 
Farmers and seed companies may be considered, in some circumstances, forming a 
“single undertaking”, for instance when seed companies hold ownership of the 
product with the producer under contract. 
 
B. Farmers: Antitrust’s Fallen Heroes? 
 
It is not yet clear whether such level of penetration into the typical farming business 
is sustainable for farmers as independent economic entities. Considering the recent 
trend of global agrochemical players to build IT-platforms to sell decision-making 
services to farmers complementary to their already existing product portfolios these 
companies will have access to information that has never been collected and shared 
before. The farmer becomes critically dependent on the product mix from a single 
provider or a limited number of providers. This may result in a shrinking choice for 
farmers of seeds cultivars. A recent study by Hilbeck et al. of farmers’ choice of 
seeds in four EU countries with different levels of GM crop adoption, showed that in 
Spain, which has adopted GM maize, the seed market appeared to be more 
concentrated with fewer differentiated cultivars99.  
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Another study conducted by Benbrook found that contrary to the argument of 
biotech crop proponents that genetically-engineered crops reduce pesticides use, 
“the spread of glyphosate-resistant weeds in herbicide-resistant weed management 
systems has brought about substantial increases in the number and volume of 
herbicides applied”100. The study documented that farmers had to increase 
pesticides use in the United States over the period of 1996-2011 by 7% (equivalent 
of roughly 183 million kgs). 
In some sense, farming as an industry becomes increasingly commoditisized, 
meaning that farmers are finding themselves outsourcing more and more critical 
inputs (i.e., seeds) and decisions (through IT decision-support systems) to global 
agriculture solutions providers. The farmer’s only value added is his labor, by which 
we mean actual efforts spent on growing the harvest.  The farmers are increasingly 
losing control of seed materials (this decision in turn defines the mix of crop 
protection products and other inputs), and very soon they will outsource other 
decision-making capabilities. In the long run, to stay competitive farmers will be 
forced to use high quality seeds supplied to them from a limited number of global 
players, and an associated array of complementary products to these seeds from the 
same number of providers. Also, they will be using relatively the same agriculture 
machinery from the other limited group of global equipment providers such as John 
Deere, CNH, AGCO, Claas, etc.  
Farmers’ labor commoditization means that the only available choice to 
compete will be cost reduction. As a result, one might expect a further trend of small 
and mid-sized farmers to exit the market, further expansion of the big farms and 
vertically integrated agriculture holdings. In some countries where agriculture 
industry to a significant extent consists of small and mid-sized farmers – i.e., India, 
Brazil, China, selected Latin-American and African countries – this may be a rather 
painful process.  
Ultimately, consumers will probably benefit from these trends by getting 
agriculture products at cheaper prices. However, this will be largely at the expense of 
the farming industry. One may also argue that a measure of consumers’ welfare 
should also include a quality dimension, including sustainability and quality of food 
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(in terms of nutrient value), or that, at least in order to include these dimensions in 
competition law and policy, mergers (and at least horizontal cooperation 
agreements) in the food sector should be assessed under broader public interest 
standards. 
Ironically, the interests of farmers and consumers were considered as largely 
compatible in the formative years of the Sherman Act. The role of the Granger 
movement and their revolt against the monopoly power of railways in the passage of 
the Sherman Act has long being highlighted101. Some agricultural cooperatives were 
excluded from the scope of the Sherman Act with Section 6 of the Clayton Act 1914, 
which also provided an exemption for labor unions. According to this provision, the 
antitrust laws should not be construed to prohibit the existence and operation of 
agricultural organizations instituted for purposes of mutual help and allowing 
individual members of such organizations to carry out these “legitimate objects”, the 
“labor of a human being […] not [being] a commodity or article of commerce”.  
Passed in 1922, the Copper-Volstead Act further provides for an exemption 
from antitrust liability to allow farmers to join together on collectively marketing or 
processing commodities they produce. The statute is implemented by the USDA 
which may file complaints against cooperatives that engage in a monopoly or a 
restriction of trade to such an extent that the price of the commodity is “unduly 
enhanced”102. Christine Varney observed how “the Capper-Volstead Act’s 
proponents viewed cooperatives as a bulwark against ‘middlemen’ and ‘speculators’ 
that unfairly preyed on both farmers and consumers”, these firms “collecting [their] 
tribute from both the farmer and the consumer”103. The scope of the exemption was 
however narrowly construed by US courts104.  
EU competition law also includes derogations for producer organizations, on 
the basis of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) provisions of the EU Treaties and 
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related secondary legislation105. It is worthy of note that the extent of such specific 
regimes of immunity for agricultural cooperatives have been expanding in the EU 
while they have been shrinking in the U.S.  It is remarkable that these exemptions 
aim to protect farmers from the superior bargaining power of retailers downstream106. 
The recent draft Commission guidelines on the specific competition rules for 
common market organisations (including agricultural cooperatives) active, for 
instance, in the arable crop sector, however, omit any reference to the important 
power exercised by the upstream input of production suppliers, in particular global 
seed companies. 
From a political economy perspective, it may make sense for emergent and 
developing jurisdictions to take into account the inter-country distribution of the total 
surplus value of the global food value chain when designing their competition law 
interventions in this area. The high concentration in food supply chains, in particular 
in the factors of production level including seeds, and the bargaining power that 
ensues have been examined by a briefing note of the UN special rapporteur on the 
right to food, which is of particular interest for our study, in view of the emphasis put 
on the “direct link between the ability of competition regimes to address abuses of 
buyer power in supply chains and the enjoyment of the right to adequate food”107.  
The report highlights concerns over the strategies of input suppliers and their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis farmers. Faced with a reality of decreasing revenues, 
small farmers are pressed to produce even more agricultural commodities in order to 
earn short-term income in an attempt to meet daily expenses, which leads to 
oversupply and the vicious circle of further depression of prices, sometimes even 
below the average cost of production. This has particularly devastating 
consequences in the developing world and emerging economies, these effects not 
being alleviated through a high level of state subsidies, as it is the case in Europe, 
for instance. The special rapporteur recommends that “competition law regimes 
should be improved to comport with general human rights principles of equality and 
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non-discrimination, and to facilitate the realization of human rights, including among 
others the right to food, the right to work, and the right to development”108.  
More concretely, this implies that countries exporting agricultural commodities 
should not adopt “competition laws focused on consumer welfare on the model 
proposed by the OECD,” but should instead seek to “ensure that, in the competition 
law regime that they set up, they offer a sufficient high level of protection of their 
producers against abuses of dominant positions by commodity buyers, food 
processors or retailers, as part of their obligation to protect the right to food under 
their jurisdiction”109.  
For the special rapporteur, “substantive competition laws should recognize 
that consumer harms arising from excessive buyer concentration are incipient and 
therefore indeterminate in character, but that this indeterminacy should not be a 
reason for failing to control such conduct”, a “more enriched conception of consumer 
welfare” being needed, “one that takes account of consumers’ interests in 
sustainability – rather than focusing purely upon short-term price changes”110.  
In view of the inability of major developed countries’ competition authorities to 
control excessive buyer power, because of the remoteness of the effects of such 
power on their consumers, according to the effects doctrine,111 developing 
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jurisdictions, in which the majority of impoverished farmers are located, should set up 
“credible competition authorities of their own”. The special rapporteur concludes that 
 
“[…] developed countries, especially those where dominant agribusiness 
buyers are domiciled, should be more active in addressing the creation, 
maintenance and abuse of such buyer power, with a view not only to 
protecting the suppliers, particularly in developing countries, from the impacts 
of abuses of dominant positions, but also to ensur[e] the longer term stability 
of supply for consumers. 
 
Developing countries where food insecurity is widespread in the rural areas 
and where violations of the right to adequate food of small-scale farmers are 
common, may wish to create competition regimes that impose on buyers 
specific duties, or subject them to specific types of control, in certain supply 
chains or for certain commodities that are particularly important to the 
revenues of small-scale farmers, with a view to preventing types of conduct 
which result in harm[] to the welfare of producers”112. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The rising levels of consolidation of the seeds market globally, because of the 
expansive M&A strategies of the various players and the dense network of cross-
licensing arrangements and IP pools, leads to the emergence of a tighter oligopoly in 
this important segment of the global food value chain. This may raise interesting 
issues as to the need of such consolidation for a more intensive R&D effort, and 
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more generally, on the allocation of the total surplus among the various segments of 
the global food value chain.  
At the same time, farmers relinquish functions, such as risk management, in 
favour of integrators, thus leading to an informal quasi-vertical integration at the 
global scale of the production segment of the global food value chain, which also has 
broader social implications that are not usually examined in competition law 
assessment.  
One may advocate the consideration of value chains, or more generally the 
overall value of transactions,113 in assessing the thresholds for merger control, as the 
turnover of past business years does not necessarily represent the competitive 
significance of the transaction, in terms of the likely reduction of potential 
competition.  
It is also possible to think of assessing mergers and other transactions leading 
to consolidation of the seeds market from a public interest perspective, in view of the 
broader concerns animating public policy in this context and the existence of a nexus 
of international commitments as to biodiversity, sustainability, the right to food etc114.  
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The role of public authorities, including competition authorities, in supporting 
the development of commons for germ plasm and traits, as well as in putting in place 
a vibrant generic biotech crops market, constitute additional strategies in order to 
open up access to the seeds market and loosen the pressure that input suppliers, in 
particular global seed companies, exercise on farmer’s revenues.  
This raises important questions as to the sociological categories protected by 
competition law (consumers, farmers, small & medium undertakings), and the explicit 
consideration of the distributive implications of competition law enforcement, also at 
the level of a specific jurisdiction. Although there is important work on the effects of 
IP rights and IP strategies on innovation in agricultural biotechnology, there is little 
analysis over the distribution of the value brought by the innovations introduced 
throughout the various segments (and actors) of the food value chain115.  
Concerns over inequality and the role competition law may play in this 
context116 may justify claims for a “fairer” distribution of the total surplus value 
resulting from innovation, and for an increasing focus of competition law enforcement 
on the way the total value is allocated between the various segments of the chain, 
but also among the various jurisdictions in which economic actors are involved in this 
value creation. These important challenges may justify the rethinking of some of the 
core concepts of competition law enforcement and the rehabilitation of concepts that 
have been long excluded from mainstream antitrust law jargon, following the shift 
from the era of populist antitrust to the current neoclassical price theory driven 
theoretical framework117. This may prove crucial for developing jurisdictions that are 
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concerned by the way they may maintain or improve (“upgrade”) their position in the 
various global value chains118. 
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